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MEASURING THE RISK OF SOMWARE FAILURE:
A FINANCIAL APPLICATION
Susan A. Sherer
College of Business and Economics

Lehigh University

ABSTRACT
Each module included in a software system poses a differential risk of failure in operation. However,
neither traditional software reliability measurement techniques nor traditional development and testing

methodologies consider the fact that the consequences of various software failures will be very
different. This paper demonstrates how to measure the risk of failure, or expected value of loss
resulting from errors in different modules. Module risk is a meaningful measure of quality that can be
exploited throughout the software life cycle.

We describe how the risk of software failure was estimated for modules in a commercial lending
system. Analysis of the application and its use was employed to determine the financial exposure
associated with the system. The potential exposure of each module in the system was measured by
relating the individual modules to external system use. Module failure likelihood was estimated prior

to use and updated with operational results.
1.

INTRODUCTION

cerned with the selection of test cases with the highest

Since operations in almost every facet of our modern
society are dependent upon computer support, computer
failure poses a significant risk to all organizations. As
more systems operate in real time, the opportunity for
reducing this risk via human intervention is decreased.
Advances in hardware reliability have increased the
significance of software as a source of failure. The
availability of software to support strategic decision making
as well as to control critical functions has raised the level

probability of detecting the most errors (Myers 1979).

Traditionally, this has been accomplished with black box,

or data driven methodologies, and white box, or logic
driven testing. Since different software errors have
different economic consequences and likelihoods of
producing failures, traditional software testing theory is of
limited use in allocating resources to portions of systems
with the greatest risk. The ability to measure the unique

risk of failure in different modules in a software system
would provide a more meaningful measure of software

of concern regarding the consequence of software failure.

quality, which could be used to guide development efforts.

Traditional approaches to software quality assessment have

To demonstrate how the differential risk of software failure
can be evaluated, we will describe risk estimation of
modules in a loan system used by a commercial lender, one
of the 25 largest savings and loan associations in the
United States. The appraisal begins with an analysis of the

not treated the consequence of software failure. Neither
traditional software reliability measurement techniques nor
traditional development and testing methodologies consider
the fact that the consequences of various software failures

will be very different. Software reliability measurement

environment in which the software will operate to estimate
the financial consequences of failure. The exposure, or
magnitude of loss, resulting from faults in each module is
estimated through structural analysis of the software.
Finally, risk is assessed by combining exposure estimates
with failure probability estimates. The latter are predicted
from past failure history on similar modules, and updated

techniques have been adapted from hardware reliability,
where a failure has typically been modeled with a single
consequence; either the machine has been functional or it

has not. These techniques measure the number of residual
errors in a program, mean time to failure, and failure
intensity, without considering the impact of failure (Sherer
and Clemons 1987). However, since each software failure
may have unique expected consequences, traditional

as testing and system use are exploited to yield new

information about failures in these modules.

reliability measurement techniques are inappropriate for
measuring the true economic risk associated with failure.

We Will begin with an overview of the risk assessment

methodology, followed by a description of the loan system.

As systems have grown in size and complexity, often
possessing an infinite number of combinations of inputs

The risk estimation procedures will be illustrated as they
were applied to assess the lending association's risk in

and paths, they have become impossible to test until
assurance of perfection. Testing theory has been con-

using the software produced by a financial software

developer. Finally, we will suggest ways in which informa-
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tion on differential exposure and risk could have improved
the development of this software.

EXTERNAL
EXPOSURE
ASSESSMENT

ESTIMATION

OF FAILURE
PARAMETERS

2.

MODULERISKMETHODOLOGY: ANOVERVIEW
UPDATE

Software risk is defined as the expected loss due to failure
of the software during a given time period. Failures are

WITH
TEST

,RESULTS

due to faults in the software. It is infeasible to determine

the expected loss of each individual fault in a module, for
if we knew what faults existed, we would fix them and the
problem of predicting risk would no longer exist. However, we can estimate moduk risk as the product of the

*
v
MODULE

MODULE

FAILURE

EXPOSURE
ASSESSMENT

expected exposure of the module, or expected magnitude
of loss that would result from improper functioning of the
module, and the apected number of faizures resulting
from faults in that module (within a given time period).

LIKELIHOOD

ESTIMATION

In order to assess module risk, we must analyze
MODULE
External exposure

RISK
ASSESSMENT

magnitude of loss
resulting from external
use of the software

Figure 1. Overview of Risk Assessment Methodology

Module exposure

Module failure likelihood

magnitude of loss
resulting from faults in
a module

3.

probability of failure due
to faults in a module

COMMERCIAL LOAN SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

The loan system of a major Philadelphia area savings and

loan association maintains all commercial loan information
characterizing new accounts, obligors, lines, commitments,
loans, takedowns, renewals, participations, syndications,

repayment schedules, indirect liabilities, interest and fee

An overview of the methodology for risk assessment is
shown in Figure 1. Risk assessment begins with crtemal
exposure assessment which involves an analysis of the
system's operational environment. External actions that

schedules, collateral, and payment transactions. All data

entry is accomplished online. In addition, online inquiries
access the six master files: obligor, obligation, collateral,

invoice, security and control files. Daily batch processing
functions include updating the master files, creating billing

may result in loss are first identified. Scenarios describing
events that may lead to loss in the environment in which
the software will operate are developed using probabilistic

risk assessment techniques.

information, posting to the general ledger, and producing
financial and statistical reports. The software consists of

Finally, the potential loss

268 COBOL modules, including 125 online modules
operating under CICS (55 inquiry, 70 data entry), 67 batch
processing modules, and 76 report modules, all ranging in

resulting from these scenarios is estimated.

Module exposure assessment is accomplished by relating
the structure of the code to the external exposure assess-

size from 14 to more than 11,000 executable lines of code.

ment. An internal analysis of the structure of the software
is performed to determine the types of faults that may exist

in each module as well as the operational use of each
module. The module's processing function and expected

4.

EXTERNAL EXPOSURE

use are related to the external exposure analysis.

To estimate the risk associated with use of the Commercial
Loan System, the environment was scrutinized to deter-

Modu/e failure likelihood is estimated with a software
reliability model. The e pected number of failures is a
function of the number of faults in the module and the

mine actions that could contribute to loss and to assess the

significance of this loss. First, environmental hazards, or
actions by the lender that could result in financial loss,
were defined. Second, accident sequences and failure
modes resulting in these hazards were identified from study
of system use. Finally, the magnitude of the potential
losses was estimated with expected value analysis.

probability that these faults will be encountered in operation. These parameters are predicted prior to testing from
information about the code and its development. After
testing and use, Bayesian analysis is used to update these

estimates with failure history.
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4.1 Hazard Identification

well as procedures that could be used to enter the data and

To define the hazards surrounding the use of the commercial loan system at the savings and loan, the operational
environment was thoroughly studied from the perspective

of future users: clerical workers and loan officers who
would directly access the system and loan managers who
would use system reports for decision making. Users,
rather than system developers, were involved in the
identification of potential hazards in the system's environ-

review the audit reports. Consideration was given to
inquiry screen use by both loan control personnel and loan
officers.

Loan
Output

Loan
Loan
Officer

Note
Teller

Input
Control

Control

Obligor

Doesn't

alert

ment, both as the system was initially planned to operate,

as well as after future operational changes. It was neces-

Doesn't

mail
bills

Doesn't

sary to understand who could access the system and what
procedures they could use. Major hazards, summarized in
Table 1, that could result from improper use of this system
were identified through these discussions with the users.

-enter a

billing
schedule

F bank

_J

LAlerts
bank

Gets

bills

Doesn't
enter
billing

Table L Commercial Loan System Hazards

schedule

Doesn't

alert
Doesn't

mail

Consequence ($/month)

Not producing bills

Invalid interest accruals
Invalid fees
Incorrect tracking of payments, disbursements
Invalid access to financial information
Overadvance committed dollars
Insufficient collateral
Misposting of transactions to General Ledger
Customer service problems
Not managing collateral documentation

Additional clerical work
Invalid government reports

Enters
Fbills
_billing -J
schedule

$267,000

29,000
3,000
5,300

Doesn't

700

billing

bank

4

Alerts

bank

LGets

bills

enter

400

schedule

850

Doesn't

alert

1,000

bank

Doesn't

3,000
6(jo

Doesn't

800
1,000

mail

F bills

_enter a 4
billing

I

schedule

LGets
bills

4

Alerts

bank

Enters

4.2 Hazard Scenario Analysis

Lbilling

schedule
Doesn't

alert

It was assumed that all hazards arising from the use of this
system were identified. Inability to anticipate a hazard or

Doesn't

mail
Fbills

a failure scenario would, of course, result in underestima-

Enters

tion of risk. As is the case with any probabilistic risk

billing _]

schedule

assessment, the analysis is limited by completeness uncer-

Fbank

-3

LAlerts
bank

L Gets
bills

tainty: However, even with their uncertainties, well
developed probabilistic risk assessments have still been

Figure 2. Event Tree for Hazard: Not Producing Bills

found to be useful for clearly defining identifiable risks
that might otherwise not be recognized (Levine 1984).

The analysis proceeded with an identification of the failure

How could each of the hazards occur? Accident sequences
were identified by analyzing system use in the external
environment. Event trees were used to describe this use,
indicating events that could precipitate hazards as well as
events that could alter the course of an accident. Figure 2
is an example of one of the event trees that could lead to
failure to produce customer bills. All operator actions,
hardware failures, and environmental circumstances that

among them. The ultimate objective was to determine
where information deficiencies resulting from software
failure could affect the accident scenario. The focus was
on relationships among environmental events, human

could affect the outcome of the scenario were considered. :

interactions, failures of hardware components, and errone-

modes of events involved in the accident scenarios.
Consideration was given to the types of events, the conditions that could result in these events, and the relationships

ous information and control procedures that could contrib-

The focus was on the external use of the system. Loan
information sources were identified (loan officers) and
procedures that could be used by the note tellers as they
encoded forms and manually maintained Loan-In-Process
balances were analyzed. Manual coding procedures that

ute to the occurrence of the events in the accident scenar-

ios. The existence of erroneous information and control
procedures indicated where software failure could affect
the accident sequence. Fault trees were found to be useful
to depict the relationships. Figure 3 shows the events that

could be used in the Loan Control Center were studied, as
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could lead to loan control not mailing bills, an event
involved in the accident sequence leading to the system

hazard of not producing bills.

bills, it was assumed that there would be a 10 percent
chance that loan control would not realize this fact and
would not mail bills. It was assumed that the customer
would not alert the lender if bills were missing 10 percent
of the time, resulting in an expected consequence of the
hazard, not mailing bills, of $267,000.3 Similar estimates
and assumptions of the probability of events in the scenar-

NO BILLS

Loan Control

doesn't mail

ios leading to the other hazards yielded the estimated
consequences shown in Table 1.

bills

<

5.

MODULE EXPOSURE

Module exposure is an estimate of the potential loss due

To
module,
in a and
from faults
resultmodule's
could each
failuresitsthat
to
expected
function
exposure,
estimate

Forgets

use had to be related to the system's external exposure.
Software failure modes that could contribute to the
erroneous information and control procedures leading to

Does not
realize
bills missing

Does not
get bills

the hazards were identified.

Modules that could have

analyzing the module's function in the structure of the
system. Since the consequence of invalid data processing
is dependent upon how the module is being used, itself a

function of the system use, module use was related to

-

exposure.
use andtoresulting
systemleading
faults
these failure
modes were determined by

i review
\ audit
/\ ists
s 1,1/
-

A decision tree
can be used to describe a module's exposure assessment. Figure 4 depicts the tree for the module

that performs many of the financial computations for the

loans (financial posting module).
Does not

get

information

Does not
verify
records

Evaluation of the

decision tree yields the exposure when the module is used.

This estimate is multiplied by the probability that the

module will be used to obtain the exposure assessment.
We will briefly describe the components of the tree and
then elaborate upon the procedures to derive the information shown.

NOTE: The symbol <> typicatt denotes an event that is undeveloped
because because there is lack of information, money, or time to perform a

detailed analysis (Henley and Kumamoto 1981). Here, it is used to account
for the aistence of moneous information or lack of information, undeveloped events because we have not yet analyzed their causes.

Figure 3. Fault Tree for Event: Loan Control not Mailing Bills

43 Loss Estimation
Since the actual loss can take on an unlimited number of

values, based on numerous environmental factors, information on circumstances affecting the resulting loss was
consolidated utilizing expected values for each state. The
potential consequence, or exposure, of each hazard was
assessed by weighting the loss estimated for each accident
scenario by the likelihood of the accident scenario condi-

The exposure assessment assumes that the module will fail;
the likelihood will be determined later in the analysis. The

module use distribution, or probability distribution describing how the module is expected to be used, is then shown.
Conditional upon a given use, all hazards that may occur
are delineated. A hazard could occur if 1) the module
performs a function that may lead to the hazard (module
fault ana/ysis) and 2) the use of the module can lead to
the hazard (fai/ure use analysis). The probability distribution of each of the hazards (hazard probability dism'bution), conditional upon a given module use, is based upon
assumptions concerning the relative probability of the
various types of hazards. The consequence of each hazard
derives from the External Exposure Analysis.

tional upon software failure. The probability of occurrence
of each accident scenario in an event tree was determined
by computing the conditional probabilities of each of the

5.1 Module Fault Analysis

To determine whether a module may have potential faults
related to each of the external hazards, we began by
identifying the software failure modes contributing to

top events, each dependent upon factors in the fault tree.

The total expected monthly revenue was estimated at
approximately $26.7 million. If the system did not produce

erroneous information in the External Exposure Analysis.
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list

9 in iwnngn

Hazard

Incorregt Tracking

_Payments
P=.94

imi

.168

frn _ B I,11&#aL_* -

ments related to this output were revealed, enabling uS to

5,30U

determine which modules could be involved in the produc-

3,504

tion of this output. For example, all modules involved in

Clerical Work

.336

800

Government Rworts

.168

1,000

the production of bills were found by considering all

Not Producina Billi

.031

267,000

Invalid Interest

.031

29,000

transformations of data resulting in bills, logically working
backwards from the output. Significant reports, such as
key audit reports, that could be used to identify missing

Advances

Incorrect Trackina

.093
.Qil-

Takedowns

Insufficient Collateral

.186

customer Service
collateral Documentation

.093
.186

1,000

billing information were also determined and reverse

600

Cl rical Work

.186

engineering was again used to ascertain all programs

.091

800
1,000

Not Produgina Bills

.013

267,000

Invalid Interest

.041

29,000

Invil id Fees

.129

3,000

Invalid Fee8
p=.02

Government Reborts

New Accounts
Failure

$

p=.01

Exposure

Government Regorts
customer Service

.129

3,000

Insufficient Collateral

.252

eso

/52_

3,000
600

Government Reoorts

.126

1,000

191-Ertucing B i l l s

.028

267,000

.ola

Entry

29,000

Inniffirient Collateral

.084
.168

5,300
850

p=.02

Customer Service

.061

3,000

600
800
1,000

Minosting General

.12£

dger

.081

Collateral Documentation

.168

Cle.rical Work

.166

Government Renorts

.004

Modules not directly involved in the flow of the critical
data, but processing information that might alter these
data, were also deduced. For example, failure in modules
processing control data, such as calendar or divisional
reporting information, might affect a loan's billing information. Thus, for each module, we considered whether it
would perform any function related to each of the identi-

800

.252_

.084

Incorrect Tracking

modules that process information from these transactions.

1,000

Coll.Mn 1 Documentation

Invalid Interest

to trigger a forward study of the system to determine

800

.129

Clerical Work

involved in the production of these reports. Key input
transactions, such as the billing date transaction, were used

600

.258
. ZIL

Invalid Fees
Other Data

850

Clerical Work

Cuit.mer Service
Collateral
p-.01

5,300

collateral Documentation

in Use
-$2440

3,000

3,000

fied software failure modes. For example, the function of
each module was analyzed to determine if it could invalidly
maintain bill mailing information or contribute to invalid

1,000

information on the control file.

-

$2440

x

The financial posting

module, whose exposure assessment is shown in Figure 4,
was found to have the potential to be involved in 10 of the

EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT - Exposure in Use x Probability of use

.77

- $ 1879

12 hazards. Again, the analysis was limited by the examiner's ability to completely assess all modules involved in the

NOTE: The fact that :he probability of all hazards, conditional upon a
gi„en use, docs not add to one is due {0 rounding error tltat results fron, the
apportionnient of probability based upon relative likelihood (See Hazard

processing of the data. It is probable that some of the

Disnibution).

modules involved in the processing of the critical data may
not have been included. However, if designers continue to
structure their programs to minimize module coupling and
maximize module strengths (Myers 76), it is felt that it will
become more difficult to omit significant modules related
to the critical data.

Figure 4. Exposure Assessment for Financial Posting Module

Software system failure results in invalid system output or
lack of anticipated output. Thus, faults in a module could
cause a particular software failure mode if the module is

5.2 Failure Use Analysis

involved in the production of such output.

The module's function at any time, and the associated

Software failure modes were defined for each hazard,
considering the software's expected use in the external
failure mode analysis. Software functions were deduced

exposure level, could vary with the way the system is using

it; this, in turn, is related to the way the system itself is
being used. For example, the financial posting module
may be used to record loan payments or collateral deposits. Thus, the module's expected use must be related to
the external exposure. First, the system input space was
partitioned by use. The external risk assessment was then
mapped onto the system input space so that, for each

that could produce the erroneous information in the fault
trees: For example, failure of the software to produce

bills could be due to several software failure modes. These
include failure to produce an audit list of missing bill
schedules, failure to update obligation files with billing

information, failure to print bills, invalid purging of

system use, the hazards that could occur were determined.

information, invalid maintenance of bill mailing informa·

The module use distribution was estimated from knowl-

tion, invalid invoice records, or invalid information on the
control file.

edge of the system structure and use.

The Commercial Loan System's use distribution for the

savings and loan association was based upon users'

The structure of the Commercial Loan System was
analyzed to determine the location of potential faults

estimates of the number and types of daily transactions
they would make. It was found that transactions could be
categorized into ten major classifications, including data

related to each software failure mode. First, the invalid
output or lack of anticipated output by which each software

failure mode could be manifested was identified.

entry transactions accounting fur 77 percent of all transaclions, and data inquiry transactions, as shown in Table 2.

By

reverse engineering the specifications, critical data ele-
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6.

Table 1 System Use Distribution
Probability

Data Ently
Payments

.7238

Advances, Takedowns

.0154

New Accounts

.0077

Collateral Setup
Other

A number of software reliability models have been developed to describe the software failure process. We used the
Musa basic execution time model of Poisson type and
exponential class (Musa, Iannino and Okumoto 1987) to
estimate the expected number of failures due to faults in

.0077

a module during a given time period. It was assumed that
the model parameters -- the mean number of faults in a

.0154

module and the module per fault hazard rate, or probabili-

Data Inquiry

Transaction History

.2070

Obligor Name Search

.0069

Invoice Reference
Payoff

.0069

Other

MODULE FAILURE LIKELIHOOD

ty that a fault would cause a failure -- could be described

by independent Gamma probability distributions with
parameters derived from failure history of similar modules.

.0069

Bayesian analysis was used to update estimates of these
parameters as the Commercial Loan System was used and

.0023

failures were recorded and faults corrected.
The data source for parameter prediction was problem
report logs for programs previously developed by the
Commercial Loan System developer. The number of faults
corrected in 693 proFram modules, in use for at least two
years, was recorded. Modules were grouped by size, prior

The external exposure assessment was then reviewed from
the perspective of system use: What system transactions

could lead to each hazard? This was a function of the
environmental characteristics upon which the fault trees
were based. For example, the types of transaction processing that could lead to not producing bills included advances, takedowns, new accounts, and other data entry

research having suggested that size has an impact on the

number of faults in a module (Musa, Iannino and Okumoto 1987; Feuer and Fowlkes 1979; Gremillon 1984).
Negative binomial probability distributions were fit to the
data in each of three size categories: Small modules of
less than 1000 executable lines of code, medium size

transactions.

The probability distribution describing expected module
use was derived from the system use distribution. The
financial posting module, for example, would be used for
all data entry transactions but would not be invoked when
making system inquiries. The probability that this module
would be used for payments, shown as p =.94 in Figure 4,

modules of up to 5000 executable lines of code, and large

modules exceeding 5000 executable lines of code. Chi-

square tests of goodness of fit indicated very strong
evidence that these distributions correctly described the
number of faults found (Sherer 1988). Since the negative

derives from the fact that 94 percent of all data entry

binomial distribution for the number of faults can be
shown to imply a Gamma distribution for the mean
number of faults (Sherer 1988), the parameters of the
latter were computed directly from parameters of the
negative binomial. Estimated execution times of failure for

transactions were expected to be payments (See Table 2).

53 Hazard Distribution

faults found in these previously tested programs were used

to estimate their per fault hazard rates using the Musa

The probability distributions for each hazard, conditional
upon a specific module use, were based upon assumptions
concerning the relative likelihood of the hazards. Although

software reliability model. Distributions were fit to the per

fault hazard rates of the online and batch programs. These
parameters were then used to predict the mean number of

a theoretical basis for explicit consideration of consequence

faults and the per fault hazard rate of modules in the
commercial loan system based upon a module's size and
operational mode.

has been lacking in software development, it is recognized
that in practice system developers implicitly pay more

attention to the development of high exposure code. Thus,
it is believed that the likelihood of high consequence loss
is much less than the likelihood of encountering an error

with low consequence. The relative probability of each
hhzard was, therefore, based upon its severity. Minor
hazards with relatively small consequence were assumed to
be six times as likely to occur than major hazards with

- Problem reports generated at the savings and loan were
then used to indicate failures and location of fixes during
the execution of the commercial loan system by the lender.

Operational logs were analyzed to evaluate the user's
execution time of a module at the time of failure. A total
of 34 corrections were made to 21 modules during the

large consequences. Hazards with average consequence
were assumed to be three times as likely to occur as major

execution of the system at the lending association.
Bayesian estimation techniques were used to update the
estimates of the mean number of faults in a module and
the module per fault hazard rate. The expected number

hazards and half as likely as minor hazards. This relative
weighting was chosen arbitrarily; it is hoped that future
research might investigate factors that might be used to

of failures was estimated with the software reliability
model.

better predict the relative proportion of failures of different

levels of severity.
242

Table 3 compares a sample of prior mean estimators with

Table 4. Sample Risk Assessments

posterior mean estimators computed after the savings and
loan operated the system for eight months. The number

Prior to Use

of failures due to faults in modules 21, 22 and 1120
predicted prior to test was less than the actual failures

After Use for 8 Months

Expected
No. of

caused by faults in these modules. We therefore revised

our original parameters upwards for these modules.
Conversely, modules 10 and 1070 have experienced no

Module

Expected
No. of

Failures Estimated
IExposure within
Risk
$/month 1 month $/month

Failures Estimated
within
Risk
1 month $/month

failures and the likelihood of failure has decreased. The
changes in our estimates of the parameters are a function

10

1800

0.015

27

0.012

22

of the number of faults found in these modules, the sum
of the times of the failures recorded, and the amount of

111

21

0.000

0

0.001

0

162

7

0.000

0

0.000

0

execution of the module during this eight month time
period. Thus, the one fault found in module 984 has

1150
2300

increased the posterior estimate of the mean number of
faults more than the one fault found in module 22 since
the execution time of module 984 was less than that of
module 22 during this time period. Although no faults
have been found in either modules 3740 or 1070, the
decreases in the posterior estimates for module 3740 are
greater than those for module 1070 because module 3740
was executed more than 1070 during this time period.

2450

1804
1879
2573
2573

0.004
0.616
0.921
0.021

7
1157
2370
54

3500

1804

0.433

781

0.075
0.747
0.485
0.158
0.236

135
1404
1248
406
426

2400

8.

MODULE RISK ASSESSMENT IN SOFTWARE
DEVELOPMENT

The ability to assess module risk can provide a theoretical

basis for guiding project management decisions during all
phases of the software development process. Although the
Table 3. Prior and Posterior Estimates

data collection process for this application was time
consuming, it is felt that improved procedures could reduce

of Mean Number of Faults and Per Fault Hazard Rate

the effort. Moreover, the availability of the risk estimates
Estimates Prior
to Use

Use Results
(8 Months)

could have enhanced the development effort. We will
illustrate this by presenting some ways in which the
Commercial Loan System's development could have been

Estimates After
Use

Per
Module

Mean

Per Fault Execution Number Mean

Fault

Number
Faults

Hazard

Number

Hazard

Faults

Rate

10

2.907

21
22
173
984

2.907
2.907
0.683

Rate

Time per of
mon¢h
Failures

0.0026
0.0026
0.0026

1.9400

0

2.699

1.1800
0.2000

2
1

6.781

0.0023
0.0112

5.486

0.0088

0.0026

0.0004

1

1.342

0.0093

0.0026

0.0004

1

5.671

0.0093

0.0011

0.0011

0.8000
0.0200

0
1

17.625

O.0011

1120

2.907
18.868
18.868

25.922

0.0066

3740

18.868

0.0011

34.2000

0

16.502

0.0002

1070

improved if risk assessment had guided the process.

External exposure analysis could have been accomplished
prior to systems design. It has been reported that over 60
percent of errors discovered during the software development test arise during the requirements or design phases
(Lipow 1979). Prior to system design, external focus on
actions leading to loss could have revealed requirements
not initially considered, reducing errors of omission. For
example, the current design allows a loan officer to set up

a loan without a billing schedule, assuming he will subsequently remember to set up the schedule so that bills will

7.

be produced. The high consequence of not billing,
revealed during external exposure assessment, could have

MODULE RISK

suggested that the system be designed to set a default date

Module risk was estimated for the processing modules in
the commercial loan system by multiplying the exposure
assessments by the expected number of errors. Only 2

to begin billing in the event that the loan officer neglected
to enter this data.

percent of all modules analyzed demonstrated risk in

The module exposure analysis could be a very useful

excess of $100/month prior to test and use at the savings
and loan: Approximately 89 percent of the modules had

project management tool in the design and programming
stages of development. Since prior theory has suggested
that the number of errors is a function of program size,

negligible estimated risk (less than $1/month) and 98
percent of the modules had an estimated risk less than
$100/month (Sherer 1988). This fact demonstrates that

alternative designs should be considered when high
exposure modules are expected to be lengthy. The
financial posting module had one of the highest exposures.
This knowledge might have suggested alternative designs
for the functions of this module, the lengthiest module

traditional testing methodologies may not be cost effective
approaches because they do not distinguish between the
few high risk modules and the remainder of the modules
when allocating test effort. A sample of the risk assessments is shown in Table 4.

with a very high failure probability.
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Decisions concerning the selection of programmers and
programming tools could have been made relative to the
exposure of a module. More experienced programmers
would have been indicated for higher exposure modules.

•

Resource Allocation: How can software risk assessment guide resource allocation decisions along with
information on the cost of development and testing
and benefits of software release?

Software Risk Assessment could be especially useful as a
project management tool during the critical testing process.

•

Failure Prediction: Are there factors in the development process that may be used to predict the number

of failures as well as the relative proportion of failures
of different levels of severity?

As the lender began to test the system, knowledge of the

relative risk of each module would have indicated that
much more intensive test efforts be allocated to the few
high risk modules.

•

Reevaluation of the estimated risk at periodic times
throughout the use of the system could indicate where
maintenance effort would be warranted. Table 4 shows
the updated risk after eight months of operation. The
number of faults found in modules 2450 and 1150 had

Fourth Generation Languages: Are error rates
substantially affected by choice of language? In
particular, how does the use of fourth generation
languages affect the risk of failure?
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CONCLUSIONS

We have demonstrated the ability to assess the differential
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12. ENDNOTES

1.

This is uncertainty as to whether all the significant
phenomena and all the significant relationships have
been considered (Vesely and Rasmuson 1984),

address this issue.

2.

Again, completeness uncertainty is a limiting constraint
on our ability to assess risk.
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